This time of year especially, vehicle tracks are as obvious as a dog’s balls from a drone. Just follow them…..
Another thing that is going on with the Russians is the direct embedding of Spetsnaz into infantry groups. That is fine, but they lose their main purpose, which is mobility, fast assault and ability to separate from the enemy. They become cannon fodder like everyone else.
Can’t give the exact number, but in this area, the Yooks have a surprisingly large number of recon units running around, ranging from a handful of guys (between team and squad size) each to platoon size. The way this thing is moving, my guess is they will consolidate some of the smaller entities to create fast-moving strike units. It makes sense. Plus, is easier to stunt and divert and drive with larger units.
Obviously very small units will still have a role to play, but, more than a few times we have had to back-out because we did not have the firepower to cope with what developed around us. It is not unusual for small units to get into deep shit, it happened quite often in Vietnam. But here, we have enough electronic surveillance and intel to minimize that.
Where you get in trouble here is working the edges in a fast-moving situation where a lot of troops move in on your position faster than you can get an update on what is going on in your sector AO (area of operations–ed.).
We do not yet (and may never) have air support, so artillery is our main back-up.
Insertion is either by foot, or at least some of the way by vehicle. Vehicle is drop-off, which is not a reassuring thing, or you drive in and park and walk. How far you get away from the vehicle has to be considered, taking into account the terrain, enemy forces, artillery support and weather. Inserting in a vehicle is just weird to me.
One of the things in a mission brief is expected mine fields along the way, which I never trust fully, so there is that pucker factor. And, coming back to a vehicle, you have to check it for booby traps. So far this has not seemed to be a thing, since the Russians seem to try to steal it, and if they can’t destroy it. But, I still insist on checking.
Good idea I would say.
Yeah, you never know, might be smart one in the bunch.
Thing is, with an SUV, you can move pretty fast, carry the load for a small unit, and are mostly indistinguishable from civilian vehicles that might be on the same road. Of course you have no armor, so there is a risk…but, it seems a risk worth taking, since you are trying to make some effort at being on the QT. And, to be honest, I have not seen armor being all that effective here anyway.
One thing I can say is the quality of the intel has gone from horrible to outstanding.
It used to be…”we have no idea where they are, but we are of a mind they are not here”, to:
“General Ivanborschtski is in his command tent 7 klicks NE of Vojevodivka, and he was jacking off but forgot why, so we think he is exhausted or on the bottle again. We need a long team to drop by there and see if he is loaded-up with vodka or cheap Turkish porn.”
A cheap joke, but it about spans the difference in the quality of intel from the battle of Kyiv to here and now.
If they are getting the best satellite data the US has to offer (they likely are), and it is very good indeed when you are talking (mil) size units, then they know by movements, pre-positioning and transport hub activities not only what the Russians are doing, but when combined with other intel, what they are going to do. If you have the forces to action that, it is almost unbeatable.
When I say the “best sat data the US has to offer,” that is likely top tier 1 but washed data. Tier 2 they are likely getting mostly raw.
I have wondered for some time if it is coming with some analysis where it would be helpful. No doubt Ukraine has very capable people for that, but there has to be a ton of data being generated which has to be sorted through and interpreted.
It is a group effort. Workable intel has to be distilled down to action plans that requires input from every source. The level of how action is decided is unknown to me. Knowing how our systems and people work, I have some ideas….:)
The problem with sat data is with the transfer and analysis time lag, it is not always immediate, especially to operational elements in the field.
That could be seen when we had to move out of the Kreminna area. A previously static group decided to move to the city from the west right across our position. The distances were too short to call-it in time. In fact, I think we called it first, as they started streaming by us.
What did we do? Called it in, then started moving with the enemy grain in the strip of forest until we got a gap to turn southwest across the movement. It cost us some distance, but it blended us into their movements long enough so we could shag out of there.
It is the same black space techniques that we used in Vietnam, there it was carrying AKs, sometimes wearing black pajamas and moving small and low. Here, in this instance, it was moving with the flow. It is about being invisible using a spectrum of methods. “Invisible” does not always mean not being seen, it often means not being noticed as a threat.
The intel we get here on the ground is very limited, and very specific. That is understandable. We do not need a wide look at things, just what we need to do our jobs.
Most of what we do is providing ground-level intel back to the system. The other part is direct targeting and DA. Much less is direct combat, although that happens often enough to scare the shit out of us.
Well…me, can’t speak for the other guys in that respect.
Is coming up on the crack of mid-morning and I have yet to get coffee. Time to remedy that.
My schedule here means…get coffee, eat something, talk to some people, read, nap, eat lunch, then sleep. We have to keep our physical clocks on night work. Before we go out I clean my weapons, check my kit, paint my face, get a brief, tie everything tight, and move. It has become a ritual not much changed in over 50 years.
Ukraine Volunteer Transcripts 